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Among the many questions raised by recent events in Egypt is this one: to
which tense does the revolution belong? As of this writing, there is certainly
evidence that the revolution has passed. Hosni Mubarak, the previously overth-
rown dictator, has been released;' Mohamed Morsi, once a popularly elected
president, has been overthrown;2 and the current regime, with its demonstrated
willingness to crush political opposition violently, resembles the most oppres-
sive aspects of the previous two. Yet the situation in Egypt is currently charac-
terized by intense volatility. Although protests from Muslim Brotherhood sup-
porters have waned significantly in the shadow of merciless crackdowns,
protestors have adapted, and widespread resistance continues.4 Significantly,
the resistance movement has recently showed signs of widening its focus and
broadening its base. A protest march drawing thousands voiced opposition to
the Muslim Brotherhood and the current regime. Many of the signs declared,
"No legitimacy and no mandate; the revolution is back!"5
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However, whether the revolution is "back," or whether it has been ongo-
ing for nearly three years, is ultimately beside the point of this Comment. More
relevant is that persistent, ground-level turbulence that began with Mubarak's
overthrow has twice before prompted political leaders to enact fundamental,
constitutional reform. Yet none of those efforts has effectively quelled the un-
rest. Now, once again, constitutional reform is imminent. A ten-member panel
of judicial experts and members of the judiciary has recommended a number of
constitutional amendments to a recently convened fifty-member panel of party
and community leaders.7 After a months-long dialogue between these two pa-
nels, the proposed amendments will be subject to a popular referendum.
The drastic failure of previous constitutional reform suggests-and this
Comment will argue-that Egyptian political leaders have overlooked some-
thing quite fundamental about the nature of Egypt's revolution. While stating
their desire to heed the "genuine and authentic will of the people,"8 they have
failed to adequately understand the popular will and to diagnose the root cause
of an earth-shaking movement. This is perhaps because they have failed to ask
a particularly basic question: was the revolution in Egypt a "revolution" at all?
Hannah Arendt, for one, would argue that only some of the social move-
ments that we colloquially refer to as "revolutions" are in fact deserving of that
name. Arendt cautions us to distinguish true revolutions from mere coups
d'dtat, civil wars, and "palace revolutions."9 The distinguishing criterion is the
aim of the violence. True revolutions have a dual aim: they seek both liberation
via regime change, as well as the creation of lasting institutions that preserve
public freedom.10
Determining whether we can call the Egyptian Spring an Arendtian
"revolution" is not merely a semantic inquiry. Indeed, the investigation requires
determining the root cause of the movement, which will naturally point towards
an explanation for any continuing unrest and suggest possible legal and policy
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solutions. In this sense, answering the "true revolution" question is actually
another means of gaining insight into the questions of diagnosis and cure. If we
know that Egypt's revolution is an Arendtian one, then it can only be successful
if it somehow creates institutions that preserve the revolutionary spirit that en-
gendered it: institutions that allow for the exercise of public freedom."
In this Comment, I argue that the Egyptian revolution is, indeed, a "true"
Arendtian revolution, and that politicians and legal experts should keep that
characterization in mind as they recommend further constitutional reform. After
a brief overview of Arendt's conception of public freedom and the "revolutio-
nary spirit" in Part II, I examine evidence of this quest for public freedom in
Egypt's post-Mubarak history in Part III, focusing on two primary phenomena
that demonstrate the existence of Arendt's revolutionary spirit most strongly.
The first is the rapid and widespread emergence of "popular committees," polit-
ical organizations that bear a striking resemblance to revolutionary societies in
eighteenth-century France and twentieth-century Russia. The second is the per-
vasive use of social media for civic engagement and participation in political
affairs. Finally, in Part IV I consider the likely course of the revolutionary spirit
in Egypt and propose a few constitutional reforms that the current regime's ap-
pointed panel of legal experts (or any future drafters) should consider in order
to achieve a lasting resolution to the unrest.
II. PUBLIC FREEDOM AND THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT
Arendt asserts that all true revolutions are motivated by a dual aim: they
are "concerned with both liberation and [public] freedom."l 2 Liberation is
straightforwardly defined; its "fruits are absence of restraint and possession of
'the power of locomotion."' 13 Arendt devotes many pages in various works to
articulating the nature of public freedom; a brief pricis of that articulation will
be sufficient here.
In order to be free, one needs to appear before-to be seen and heard
by-a community of equals. The archetypal example of such freedom came in-
to existence with the Greek city-state, under the auspices of which citizens be-
came equal before and because of the law.14 Here, equality was a precondition
for freedom because freedom could only be manifested in actions that were
seen, heard, evaluated, and remembered by one's peers.15 These actions had the
11. It should be noted that although Arendt's theory provides one means of assessing the root
cause of a revolution, there are quite evidently multiple causes for the unrest in Egypt, and many neces-
sary corresponding policy responses. I do not suggest that Arendt's theory on revolution is by itself suf-
ficient to explain the events of the last few years in Egypt. Rather, I think it provides fundamental in-
sights that are lacking in more typical explanations, which tend to explain the revolution in terms of a
struggle for either economic rights or civil liberties.
12. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 23.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 20-21.
15. Id.; see also HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTuRE 147 (Penguin Books 2006)
(1961) [hereinafter ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE] ("Freedom needed, in addition to mere libe-
ration, the company of other men who were in the same state, and it needed a common public space to
meet them-a politically organized world. . . .").
2014] 167
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 39: 165
character of "virtuosity . .. where the accomplishment l[ay] in the performance
itself," similar to the brilliance of the performing arts. 16 Public freedom, then, is
both constructed-in that it is only possible where a political institution artifi-
cially bestows equality upon its members-and constructive-in that it is ex-
pressed through action, through the creation of something new.'7 Practically
speaking, public freedom is exercised in deliberative, self-governing bodies. It
is here that one may truly act in the presence of equals.
The spirit of public freedom, engendered by the Greek city-state and car-
ried forth by the republic of Rome, lay dormant for centuries. It reemerged, ac-
cording to Arendt, with the French and American revolutions of the eighteenth
century.18 The "revolutionary spirit," then, was essentially a spirit of public
freedom. Americans revolted not primarily because they were being unjustly
taxed, but rather out of a yearning to expand the political space in which they
could be free.' 9 They sought to increase their "share in public business" from
town assemblies to ratifying conventions, from the local to the federal. 20 The
revolution's lofty, implicit, and ultimately unachieved goal was the creation of
an institution where the revolutionary spirit of public freedom could survive for
generations, beyond the chronological end of the revolution.21
The line between liberation and revolution may be drawn in the French
example as well: after the violence of liberation, the true French Revolution oc-
curred not only in the National Assembly, but in the forty-eight sections of the
Parisian Commune and in numerous clubs and societies.22 These were "assem-
blies where the citizens [could] occupy themselves in common with [these]
public matters, with the dearest interests of their fatherland."23 It was here,
where French citizens could directly engage in deliberation and decisionmak-
ing, that freedom was manifested. The soviets (councils) that emerged during
the Russian Revolution were likewise "revolutionary organs of self-
government."24
Public freedom explains the cause and nature of true revolutions. It is the
quest for public freedom among those who have tasted or dreamed of it that
impels men and women to revolt. The signs of public freedom being exercised
are discernible in the unfolding of a revolution. Historically, we have seen them
16. ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE, supra note 15, at 151 ("Men are free ... as long
as they act, neither before nor after; for to be free and to act are the same.").
17. For an overview of the Arendtian conception of action, as distinguished from labor and
work, see HANNAH ARENDT, THE HuMAN CONDITION 145-247 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1998) (1958) [he-
reinafter ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION].
18. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 24.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 110 (describing the unique kind of happiness Americans derived from exercising
public freedom in town assemblies and, later, constitutional conventions).
21. Id. at I17, 223-24.
22. Id. at 231-32.
23. Id. (quoting Maximilian Robespierre, Report to the Assembly on the Rights of Societies
and Clubs (Sept. 29, 1791)). Although both Robespierre and Saint-Just lauded the societies for their abil-
ity to foster the public spirit, after occupying positions of political power both men turned against the
societies. See id. at 235-36.
24. Id. at 239.
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in the form of organized groups and associations, publicly-oriented delibera-
tions and discussions, and the exercise of political leadership. In these political
spaces, individuals can appear before equals, act, and be witnessed as they par-
ticipate in the creation of something new.
To find that the unrest in Egypt is indeed a true Arendtian revolution, we
must find evidence that the violence has been motivated by something more
than mere liberation from oppression-that its spirit was not only destructive
but also constructive. In other words, if the Egyptian revolution intended more
than liberation, we should see that Egyptians themselves have participated in
public affairs and the activities of governance. We should see that they have not
only expressed grievances about the past, but also deliberated about the future.
We should see that they have not only protested the abuses of the old regime,
but have also actively taken on the responsibilities of governance to build a
new one. We should see a modem, Egyptian analogue to America's town meet-
ings and ratifying conventions and France's revolutionary clubs and societies.
We should see what Thomas Jefferson described as "the germs, the first feeble
beginnings, of a new type of political organization, of a system which would
permit the people to become . . . 'participators in government."' 25
III. THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT IN EGYPT
Arendt cited American ratifying conventions and French clubs and socie-
ties as evidence of those movements' truly revolutionary character. In making
an analogous claim with respect to Egypt, I draw evidence primarily from two
phenomena: the emergence of popular committees as informal organs of neigh-
borhood governance, and the widespread use of social media for participation
in political activities. Like their eighteenth-century counterparts, these events
arose in the aftermath of major regime change, and they reveal vividly how
large numbers of Egyptians have actively asserted their public freedom.
A. Popular Committees
The scene is an alleyway in Imbaba, an impoverished and densely popu-
lated Cairo neighborhood. It is approximately 8:30 PM, and about a dozen local
residents are setting up chairs, borrowed from the local coffee shop. They start
discussing food prices and garbage collection. Then they decide to approach the
social security employees who distribute food stamps with a proposal to
streamline their distribution system. This is not an aberration, but merely one
example-recorded in early 2012-of one of Egypt's popular committees in
26
action.
These informal local governments first emerged to fill a security void in
the wake of the fall of the Mubarak regime. Convicts had been released from
25. Id. at 236 (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
26. Andrew Mills, Fending for Themselves in Cairo's Imbaba Neighborhood, PUB. RADIO
INT'L, WORLD (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.theworld.org/2012/0 1/egypt-cairo-imbaba.
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prisons at the same time that police were removed from the streets. 2 7 Although
they began in major cities, the popular committees quickly expanded to rural
regions as well, and they organized a national conference in April 2011.28 Their
original mission, developed in response to the urgent need for community secu-
rity in the absence of police, has since broadened: while they continue to exer-
cise a "neighborhood watch" function, most popular committees now engage in
a startlingly broad array of governing activities.29
Given the dire economic and infrastructural conditions facing most Egyp-
tian communities, much of the popular committees' work has necessarily fo-
cused on direct quality-of-life improvements. Various committees have re-
cruited large groups of volunteers to monitor traffic. 30 They have organized
sporting events and street cleanups.31 Not only have committees engaged local
residents in improvement projects, but they have also served as a crucial inter-
mediary between the people and the state. That role has often been opposition-
al: committees have fostered transparency and bolstered accountability by ex-
posing corrupt local officials and abusive police officers.3 2 But the committees
have also successfully lobbied and cooperated with the state to acquire and de-
liver essential services to neighborhoods, including healthcare, gas lines, and
lighting.33 The committee in Imbaba elicited a personal visit from the governor
of Giza and a promise to remove all garbage within a week.34
However, these bread-and-butter accomplishments should not obscure the
decidedly political nature of popular committees. They are, in fact, deliberative
bodies for discussing, charting, and actively shaping the future course of Egypt.
The Imbaba committee has organized nonpartisan political education classes35
and a "Know Your Rights" campaign. 36 A committee in Al Basatin, outside of
27. Asya El-Meehy, Egypt's Popular Committees: From Moments of Madness to NGO Di-
lemmas, 42 MIDDLE EAST REP. 29 (2012), http://www.merip.org/mer/mer265/egypts-popular-
committees. One of the many examples of political ddji vu over the last several months has been the
resurgence of popular committees in the wake of Morsi's downfall, again for the purpose of restoring
security and order. Their assistance was at first actively encouraged by the current regime; then it was
banned. See Maria Abi-Habib, In Egypt Clashes, Civilians Oppose Protesters, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 17,
2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324139404579016443005082408; Egyp-
tian Police Ban Popular Security Committees, AHRAM ONLINE (Aug. 18, 2013), http://english.ahram.org
.eg/NewsContent/1/0/79387/Egypt/Egyptian-police-ban-popular-security-committees.aspx.
28. Id.
29. Much of the evidence in this Section (and, to a lesser extent, the following Section) is
anecdotal in nature; it focuses on the activities of particular committees (or later, social media sites) ra-
ther than provide aggregate data on the number of such organizations or the demographic makeup of
their membership. This reflects both the novelty of the phenomena and the consequent paucity of empir-
ical studies on the topic.
30. Michael Kimmelman, Who Rules the Street in Cairo? The Residents Who Build It, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/28/arts/design/in-cairo-rethinking-the-city-
from-the-bottom-up.html.
31. Mills, supra note 26.
32. El-Meehy, supra note 27.
33. Id.
34. Rana Khazbak, Popular Committees Bring True Spirit of Democracy to the Streets, EGYPT
INDEP., Aug. 23, 2011, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/popular-committees-bring-true-spirit-
democracy-streets.
35. Kimmelman, supra note 30.
36. Khazbak, supra note 34.
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Alexandria, sponsored "symposia to raise youth awareness of the constitutional
amendments in the March 2011 referendum, the evolving role of the popular
committees and the importance of 'active' citizenship."37 Multiple founders
from that same committee ran as independents in the parliamentary elections in
2011, and one was selected as a youth representative in the constitutional as-
sembly.
The rhetoric of the leaders of the popular committees themselves best
evoke their political spirit. "This is the true democracy," said Ahmed Ezzat, the
general coordinator of the popular committees.39 "It's the popular democracy,
not elite democracy. Voting in parliamentary and presidential elections is not
enough. The main stakeholders have to be the decision makers all along even
after electing MPs.,4o
Khaled Atef, the president of the Imbaba committee, echoed the same
sentiment: "The [former] regime wanted us to think [that they do] everything
and the people do nothing. [The people didn't] participate in political life. In
one party rule, the people weren't allowed to have a role.' ' Now, Atef said,
"[w]e are the government."42
B. Social Media
It is no secret that social media played an instrumental role in the coordi-
nation and mobilization of protestors before and during Mubarak's toppling.
The April 6 Movement carried out various demonstrations, including its found-
ing event-a massive worker's strike in el-Mahalla el-Kubra on April 6,
2008-with the help of social media.43 Facebook was arguably the primary
means by which protestors were notified and pressed to attend the Tahrir
Square demonstrations beginning on January 25, 2011. The "We Are All
Khaled Said" page registered fifty thousand attendees for the protest only three
days after the virtual event's creation.44 "Cyberactivists" in Egypt and else-
where have used social media for documentation or "citizen journalism,"
broadcast of information, mobilization, cocreation (such as the planning of pro-
tests), transfer of resources, and fundraising.45
The variety of uses for social media underscores the fairly obvious point
that social media technologies are tools that human beings can use for a variety
37. El-Meehy, supra note 27.
38. Id.
39. Khazbak, supra note 34.
40. Id.
41. Mills, supra note 26.
42. Id.
43. Maryam Ishani, The Hopeful Network, FOREIGN POL'Y, Feb. 7, 2011,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/the hopefulnetwork.
44. Sahar Khamis & Katherine Vaughn, Cyberactivism in the Egyptian Revolution: How Civic
Engagement and Citizen Journalism Tilted the Balance, ARAB MEDIA & SOC'Y 1,10 (2011),
http://www.arabmediasociety.com/articles/downloads/20120313094800_KhamisCyberactivismupdate
d.pdf.
45. Mary Joyce, 7 Activist Uses of Digital Tech. Popular Resistance in Egypt, INT'L CENTER
ON NONVIOLENT CONFLICT (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.nonviolentconflict.org/images/stories/webinars
/joyce webinar.pdf.
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of different purposes, not all of which are political in the Arendtian sense. Be-
cause the object of our search is limited to uncovering evidence of a quest for
public freedom in Egypt, there will necessarily be many examples of social
media that fall outside the scope of this investigation. Even the catalytic use of
Facebook in mobilizing the massive Tahrir Square demonstrations, for exam-
ple, is not itself evidence of a true revolutionary spirit. We seek examples of
activities that transcend the liberation impulse, and which instead reflect a con-
structive will to govern, and thereby assert public freedom.
In the American context, Arendt saw the revolutionary spirit as most vi-
brantly expressed in constitutional ratifying conventions where elected repre-
sentatives debated the provisions of what was to become the U.S. Constitution.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the spirit of public freedom has thrived in
the analogous Egyptian context-in online debates surrounding both constitu-
tional amendments proposed in March 2011 and the draft constitution proposed
in December 2012. The differences in time and setting should not obscure their
common animating purpose: direct participation in a novel political project.
What follows is a small sampling of this discourse during Egypt's two
constitutional referenda. Regarding the proposed amendments of 2011, one
blogger criticized provisions that awarded too much political power to the ex-
ecutive branch: "Why was there no method of checks and balances included
between judicial, executive, and legislative powers?'A6 Others objected to the
very idea of amendments, claiming that this was the best and perhaps only
chance Egyptians would have to draft a new constitution. 7 Another blogger
explained that some supporters were urging passage despite their disagreement
with some of the articles so that democratic elections could be held sooner ra-
ther than later.48 In short, the discussion on the blogosphere indicates-at least
in many instances-thoughtful deliberation, weighing of values, and ultimately,
declarations of both support and dissent.
Over twenty months later, a similar, albeit more one-sided, debate raged
when Morsi's government proposed a draft constitution for referendum. One
man posted a Facebook note entitled "Thirty-two reasons to vote 'no' on
Egypt's draft constitution." It was shared 1,483 times.49 Others outlined their
rationales in Google documents50 and online flyers.5 1 When the National Salva-
46. Elazul, Square One: A Conspiracy Theory, THE GOOD, THE BAD, THE ELAZUL (Mar. 18,
2011,2:34 AM), http://www.elazul.me/2011/03/square-one-conspiracy-theory.html.
47. Egyptian-in-USA, Vote NO, EGYPTIAN WISH (Mar. 16, 2011, 1:46 PM),
http://egyptianwish.blogspot.com/2011/03/vote-no.html.
48. Tarek Amr, Egypt: The Constitutional Amendments, GLOBAL VOICES (Mar. 25, 2011, 9:27
PM), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2011/03/25/egypt-the-constitutional-amendments.
49. Khaled Fahmy, 32 Reasons to Vote "No" on Egypt's Draft Constitution, FACEBOOK (Dec.
2, 2012, 8:00 AM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/khaled-fahmy/,:l-L ,- 9 ,
-- I -,j-.j .-4 3 78 9 3 036275517/j il Iol. Obviously, even if thousands of people participate in a
site, they represent only a small proportion of Egypt's over eighty million people. The numbers of views
or posts cited here and elsewhere in this Section show the significance, rather than the dominance, of
social media in the Egyptian political discourse.
50. See, e.g., Ahmed Hassan, Monitoring of the Most Important Observations and Criticisms
of the Draft Constitution, GOOGLE, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheet/lv?key=OAn8AdgeNyN6RdEl
GNGJfUGYtaXVFTFZHVIFZSIREZVE&pli=1 (last visited Nov. 4, 2013).
51. See, e.g., Say No, MEDIAFIRE, http://www.mediafire.com/view/?v5q406bt25rbwur (last
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tion Front called for a boycott of the referendum, there was widespread debate.
Twitter posts argued that the boycott would be futile, and called for "awareness
campaigns" instead.52
Although the online referendum debates were limited to discussions of
predetermined provisions, Egyptian citizens are using social media as a novel
means of proposing new policy measures for themselves. In the immediate af-
termath of Mubarak's fall, Wael Ghonim-a former Google executive and
founder of the "We Are All Khaled Said" Facebook page-started a Google
Moderator page for Egypt.53 The page allows users to post new policy ideas
and vote on ideas contributed from others. The most popular ideas then bump
to the top. At last viewing, the group had 41,801 users who had posted a total
of 52,041 ideas addressing an enormous variety of substantive policy issues.54
Some of the posted ideas also include links to webpages where users can take
action to support particular projects. Examples of more popular proposals in-
clude the computerization of voting and replacement of electoral cards with
regular forms of identification; the formation of an emergency education plan-
ning committee and increased spending on public education; and the renovation
and increased sterilization of hospitals.55
In short, while the use of social media to organize and mobilize protesters
during the Egyptian liberation movement garnered worldwide attention, its role
in the creation of a political space has been equally significant. In Egypt, social
media has provided a forum for many of the highest activities of democratic
governance, including the proposal of ideas, discussion and debate, deliberation
about which future paths are in the nation's best interest, and even action ac-
cording to popularly approved plans. These activities go beyond the impulse to
liberate: along with the emergence of popular committees, they are an assertion
of public freedom and evidence that Egypt's revolution was a "true revolution"
in the Arendtian sense.
None of this is intended to elide the critical differences between public
freedom as expressed through social media and public freedom as manifested
in physical, self-governing, deliberative bodies. Indeed, while social media
provides clear expressions of the revolutionary spirit, for a variety of reasons it
cannot also furnish a full or enduring institution for the exercise of public free-
dom. For one, the online forum's virtually unlimited scope of participation pos-
es major logistical problems. It is impractical for a citizen to consider the tens
of thousands of ideas generated on a Google Moderator page, let alone to influ-
visited Nov. 4, 2013).
52. Egypt's Opposition to Boycott Referendum Vote, GLOBAL VOICES ONLINE (Dec. 9, 2012,
8:50 PM), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/12/09/egypts-opposition-to-boycott-constitution-referendu
rn-vote.
53. See Curt Hopkins, Protestors Use Google Moderator to Brainstorm Egypt's Future,
READWRITE (Feb. 12, 2011), http://readwrite.com/2011/02/15/google moderateusedtobrainstorm_
egypts future.
54. Weal Ghonim, Egypt 2.0, What Do We Need? What Are Our Dreams?, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/moderator/?hl=ar#15/e=581e0&t=581eO.40&f-58leO.6al891 (last visited Nov.
4, 2013) (Google moderator page).
55. Hopkins, supra note 53.
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ence that conversation.56 Moreover, while social media has the potential to in-
corporate millions into political discussions, it does nothing to increase the
number of actual government actors. This is problematic because the exercise
of public freedom through self-government requires both deliberation and im-
plementation. Social media usually fosters only the former. Finally, anonymity
in social media presents another problem. As discussed earlier,5 7 in the Arend-
tian framework, public freedom is realized through being witnessed by peers.
But the level of anonymity varies widely in the world of social media. Even the
most realistic means of appearance (e.g., live, high-resolution video streaming)
lack the essential quality of physicality, which makes actors unique and nov-
el.58
Although social media is not a tool for the full expression of public free-
dom, it has, at the very least, revealed the emergence and spread of the revolu-
tionary spirit in Egypt. Citizens have utilized its communicative tools to engage
constructively in the activities of governance, from the proposal of policy ideas
to the debate over constitutional provisions. These developments, along with
the emergence of the popular committees, provide ample evidence to conclude
that Egypt's revolution was a "true revolution" in the Arendtian sense. The co-
rollary of this statement is that the aim of the Egyptian revolution is the consti-
tution (and constitutionalization) of the revolutionary spirit, or the creation of
lasting institutions for the exercise of public freedom. The next relevant ques-
tion is whether that elusive goal may yet be achieved.
IV. SAVING THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT
The revolutionary spirit that emerged with the revolutions of the eigh-
teenth century proved fleeting: paradoxically, it began to die with the birth of
new regimes. In France, a highly centralized national government, embodied in
and empowered by the National Assembly, soon went to battle with the popular
clubs and societies.59 In that battle, the Assembly-or more accurately, the Ja-
cobin party-obtained the upper hand. The societies were instrumentalized to
root out dissidents, and they were co-opted in a fierce campaign to ensure Jaco-
bin loyalty. The Bolsheviks commandeered the soviets using the same me-
thods over a century later.61 America also lost its revolutionary spirit, less from
an active contest for power between rulers and ruled, and more from that spi-
rit's gradual fading and dwindling over time. Regardless, in each of the three
cases, an Arendtian revolution, engendered by the desire to assert public free-
56. As Arendt points out, the larger a governing body, the more it is subject to summary statis-
tics at the expense of individual action: "[D]eeds will have less and less chance to stem the tide of beha-
vior. . . ." ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 17, at 43.
57. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
58. ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION, supra note 17, at 179 ("In acting and speaking, men
show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities and thus make their appearance in the
human world, while their physical identities appear without any activity of their own in the unique shape
ofthe body and sound ofthe voice.") (emphasis added).
59. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 233.
60. Id. at 235, 239.
61. Id. at 239.
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dom, ultimately ended in failure. Without formal institutions where public free-
dom could be exercised, the revolutionary spirit was either actively destroyed
or passively neglected.
What these revolutions ought to have produced, in Arendt's view, was
something like the constitutionalization of the township or the town meeting,62
or better yet, the "wards" envisioned by Thomas Jefferson near the end of his
life.63 The idea was for every county to be divided into "elementary repub-
lics"-wards-which would allow for every willing citizen to participate di-
rectly in the public affairs of the republic as they had done during the period of
revolution.64 These decentralized institutions of highly local government would
create a lasting space for the enduring practice of public freedom.
The question that concerns us here is whether these historical lessons-
that the spirit of public freedom is inherently tenuous, even under threat, and
that if it is to have a chance at survival, it must be granted an institutional dwel-
ling place-can be successfully applied in the case of Egypt. In other words,
how can Egypt create institutions for the enduring practice of public free-
dom?6s
As it turns out, Egypt has a longstanding history of local government.
However, these institutions lacked political and financial autonomy, and there-
fore functioned primarily as administrative arms of the central government. 6 6
Their responsibilities were generally limited to infrastructure maintenance and
service delivery, and even then their decisions were usually subject to executive
or legislative veto.67 Moreover, before Mubarak's fall, the local council seats
were almost exclusively purchased or acquired through patronage networks and
the councils were dominated by family and friends of Mubarak's National
Democratic Party.68 In 2008, , Mubarak allies took 99.13% of the 52,000 open
seats, including over 43,000 seats that were completely uncontested.69 Unders-
tandably, then, the protestors who participated in the liberation movement in
early 2011 demanded the councils' dissolution, and in June of that year an
Egyptian court ordered that they be disbanded.7 0 Rather than hold popular elec-
tions to replace the council seats, however, the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom
and Justice Party announced plans to replace the councils with its own "civil
62. Id. at 227.
63. Id. at 240.
64. Id. at 242.
65. Just as Arendt's theory is not independently sufficient to explain the unrest in Egypt, see
supra note 11, decentralized political institutions are not independently sufficient solutions. For exam-
ple, I do not discount the importance of a stable central government, human rights protections, or
growth- and jobs-promoting economic policy.
66. JAMES B. MAYFIELD, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN EGYPT 53 (1996).
67. Id. at 54-58.
68. Mohamed Elshahed, Op-Ed., Egypt's Government: Designed for Dictatorship, AL
JAZEERA (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/20111018844746229
.html.
69. Dina Salah Amer, Egyptian Court Orders Dissolution of Mubarak-Era Local Councils,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/world/middleeast/29egypt.html.
70. Id.
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organizations," which were handpicked rather than elected.7 1 Municipal elec-
tions have frequently been "scheduled," but have never been carried out.
Egypt's history of failed attempts to decentralize makes clear that the on-
ly hope for creating enduring spaces for the practice of public freedom is
through constitutional provisions that guarantee the autonomy of local govern-
ments. While written guarantees will not by themselves afford sufficient pro-
tection, anything short of such provisions will almost necessarily fail.
The Egyptian Constitution of 201272 contains five articles devoted to the
composition and provenance of local councils, but each article makes promises
that are rendered illusory. For example, Article 188 provides that local councils
are to be directly elected for terms of four ears, but it fails to specify when and
how frequently elections are to be held.7 The disbandment of local councils
over two years ago and the continued delay with municipal elections are evi-
dence enough of this provision's vacuity.
On its face, Article 189 outlines a fairly generous substantive policy do-
main for each local council. It provides that each council "shall be concerned
with the issues that matter in the unit it represents and shall create and manage
local facilities-economic, social and health-related-and other activities."74
But the final phrase-"in the manner regulated by law"-qualifies the rest of
the Article. Ultimately, the parliament, a competitor for political power, may
determine the limits of the councils' responsibilities.75 The same phrase con-
cludes Article 191 ("Every local council shall be in charge of its own budget
and final accounts, in the manner regulated by law.") and Article 192 ("It is
prohibited to dissolve local councils as part of a comprehensive administrative
procedure. The manner to dissolve and reelect any one of them shall be regu-
lated by law."). 76 Although phrased so as to suggest limiting the national gov-
ernment's authority, Article 192 actually assigns the central government-and
most likely, the president-an enumerated right to dissolve a local council.7 7
Article 190 also includes an exception that virtually destroys the rule: the
decisions of each local council "are final and not subject to interference from
the executive authorities, except to prevent the council from overstepping lim-
its, or causing damage to public interest or the interests of other local coun-
cils."78 This "public interest" exception alone may be broad enough to furnish
71. Al-Masty Al-Youm, Brotherhood Replaces Municipal Councils, EGYPT INDEP., June 7,
2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/brotherhood-replaces-municipal-councils.
72. At the time of writing, this was the most recent constitution, and no other constitution had
been drafted and approved by the fifty-member committee. See, e.g., Gamal Essam El-Din, Committee
to Vote on Egypt's Proposed Constitution Next Week, AHRAM ONLINE (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/86944/Egypt/Politics-/Committee-to-vote-on-Egypts-new
-constitution-next-.aspx. Consequently, I have confined my analysis to the 2012 constitutional provi-
sions.
73. CONSTITUTION OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT, 11 Sept. 1971, as amended, May 22,
1980, May 25, 2005, March 26, 2007, March 19, 2011, December 22, 2012, art. 188.
74. Id. art. 189.
75. Id. art. 189.
76. Id. arts. 191, 192.
77. Id. art. 192.
78. Id. art. 190.
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the executive branch with constitutional cover for the invalidation of virtually
any local council decision.
Meaningful decentralization would require a few relatively minor
amendments. These would consist of removing the "in a manner prescribed by
law" qualifier from Articles 189 and 191; the "public interest veto" exception
provisions in Article 190; and the second sentence of Article 192, so that disso-
lution of local councils is prohibited without exception. Also, Article 188,
which provides for the direct election of council seats, should be elaborated to
guarantee that elections be regular, timely, free, and fair.80 With these modifi-
cations, local councils would have final decision-making authority within cer-
tain constitutionally enumerated policy areas. The executive and legislative
branches would be prevented from nullifying any final decision of a local
council. Finally, the boundaries of authority between local and central govern-
ment would be policed only by the judiciary. In short, Egypt would have a
fighting chance to begin an institutional tradition of local governmental auton-
omy.
V. CONCLUSION
It is true that what ought to be done and what will be done are two very
separate concerns, and the focus of this Comment has been on the former ques-
tion. It is relatively straightforward to prescribe a future course for Egypt where
the audience is sympathetic to the Arendtian ideal of public freedom. The cur-
rent regime, however, has been seemingly unable to tolerate any political oppo-
sition whatsoever, and it has denied any legitimate place within the government
to members of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party, the larg-
est in Egypt.8' Individuals appointed by the current regime are quite unlikely to
create a constitutional structure that formalizes a place for dissidents, even if at
the local level.
As long as widespread unrest continues, however, an impetus for regime
change and constitutional reform will exist. Ultimately, the fate of Egypt's re-
volutionary spirit hangs in the balance "between government and the people,
between those who were in power and those who had helped them into it, be-
tween the representatives and the represented." 82 It is a struggle for the right to
govern, to act among equals, to be free-which is to say that it is a fight to an-
swer the question of whether, in the words of Khaled Atef, the people are "al-
lowed to have a role."83 In Egypt, that question may require decades to answer.
79. Id. arts. 189, 190, 191.
80. Id. art. 180.
81. Kareem Fahim, Egypt's New Government Doesn 't Include Muslim Brotherhood, N.Y.
TIMES, July 16, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/17/world/middleeast/egypt.html.
82. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION, supra note 9, at 233.
83. Mills, supra note 26 (quoting Khaled Atef).
2014] 177

